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Abstract--A modern Digital Forensic examination, even on 
a small-scale home computer typically involves searching 
large-size hard disk drive storage, a variety of host and 
web-based applications which may or may not be known to 
the investigator, and a proliferation of web-based Internet 
history artefacts that may be highly significant to showing 
the motivation of a suspect. Faster keyword searching and 
larger and more accurate sets of file hashes may point the 
investigator to relevant artefacts but when dealing with the 
new or the unknown, or there is a need to holistically 
profile the activity of the computer, the investigator is left 
with a manual and labour-intensive investigation. This 
paper proposes using an unsupervised statistical learning 
technique called Principal Component Analysis to provide 
a novel approach to the analysis of Digital Forensic 
Internet history. The approach groups and analyses 
artefacts to produce a high-level context view of the 
timeline data. The paper proposes a Principal Component 
Analysis approach and the selection of the appropriate 
number of Principal Components is described using the 
Scree test method. A case study of the approach is shown, 
first using a simulated set of data test comprising of 820 
Mozilla Internet History artefacts and then using a set of 
5900 Internet Explorer history artefacts from real-world 
browser data. The results of the analysis are presented in a 
tabular format that provides an accessible overall view of 
the activity within the timeline. They show a promising 
approach to effectively and simply represent large 
quantities of timeline data at a high-level where basic 
patterns of usage can be determined. Further work on 
enhancing the proposed approach to include low-level 
pattern rules is discussed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Timeline data 
A digital forensic timeline is a time-ordered list constructed 
from point events recorded on a system that is under 
investigation. These are considered point events because the 
continuous use of the system is not typically recorded, rather 
what is normally examined within a forensic investigation is 
the end state of the system and its constituent files, and data 
that purports to show when the state of the system changed. 
Time-ordered lists of events can be constructed from artefacts 
at the file system, operating system and application level. The 
events broadly fall into the categories of creation, 
modification, access and in some cases destruction. Because 
time is a standard characteristic and the types of point events 
that are recorded on systems are broadly the same from source 
to source, it is possible to combine timelines from 
heterogeneous sources such as the file system, operating 
system or application logs. This ability to combine artefacts is 
the foundation of Super-Timeline Analysis [5]. A number of 
tools are available to produce and present timeline data, 
[14][15]. Although production is relatively straightforward, 
presentation that is more substantial than only showing 
artefacts per time period is not a trivial process. Existing work 
on timeline analysis tends to identify low-level events and 
possibly combine them together to form high-level events that 
are usable by an investigator, but this kind of method requires 
prior knowledge or known patterns of behaviour to search for 
[6]. 
 
Marrington's [9] doctoral thesis on 'computer profiling' 
identifies that traditional low-level models of computing 
behaviour are inappropriate and that "a framework for 
practically describing a computer system and its history at a 
level of abstraction suitable for a human investigator is still 
absent" and goes on to conclude that "digital forensics 
literature lacks a formal model which can be used in practical 
digital investigations to describe an entire computer system 
and its history".  
 
Gladyshev and Patel [4] provide some interesting 
formalisation of the time boundaries to events and show that 
there is a transitive relationship between events. Abraham [1] 
discusses Event Chains, which are distinct actions relevant to 
an investigation that occur in a sequential order. Such an event 
chain can be represented A→B→C, but may, or may not have 
other optional events within the chain such as A→B→D→C. 
This would therefore create an event chain rule AB*C with 
some kind of 'temporal sliding window' between the events. 
This fits rather nicely with Gladyshev and Patel [4], where the 
time of events A and B, T
A
 < z < T
B
, where z is the 'sliding 
window' for the chain. Abraham's paper also discusses 
habitual and repetitive behaviour and the problem of an event 
chain ABAB being either a distinct pattern by itself or a 
repetition of AB, which by itself might not be significant.   
 
B. Internet History 
Internet history artefacts contain a time, which is quite often 
but not always UTC and may require processing to local dates 
and times [10]. Different browsers have different levels of 
resolution for the date time artefacts, with [10] showing that 
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) records artefacts at the 100 
nanosecond level, up to Safari which records at the 1 second 
level. Boyd and Forster [2] describes in detail the structure of  
an IE Internet history record, which is implementation specific 
to that software but ultimately every record is a date/time and 
URL pair. The purpose, number and location of the records 
have significance to the software that uses them, but from a 
timeline point of view it is important to identify the presence 
of an artefact URL located at a reliable time such that it can be 
placed onto an event point timeline and where necessary de-
duplicated. 
 
C. Purpose of this Research 
The research aim of this project is to profile systems based 
upon the timeline data, as this provides a heterogeneous 
characteristic that is present across a variety of artefacts. By 
profiling of the timeline we aim to show how the system is 
being used, any normal and abnormal behaviour of the system 
and potential identify the user of the system where there may 
be multiple possible users or usage characteristics. This paper 
focuses on web-based Internet history records for timeline 
analysis as they record activity that is highly interactive and 
involves a user. 
 
Section II of the paper outlines a novel approach to the 
analysis of Internet history timelines using Principal 
Component Analysis. Section III demonstrates the Principal 
Component Analysis approach using two sets of data as case 
study. Section IV discusses enhancing the case study, 
compares the results of the two data sets and highlights some 
of the research issues that have been raised to date using this 
approach for timeline analysis. The paper concludes with an 
overview of the results, future work and references. 
II. METHOD 
A. Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is an unsupervised 
statistical learning technique for data reduction [7]. The use of 
unsupervised technique is desirable as it requires no prior 
knowledge of the data or any training phase before the 
analysis which might be considered a 'black box' process and 
is undesirable when considering codes of practice for 
electronic evidence such as the ACPO guidelines' [12] third 
principle which states that an independent third party should 
be able to replicated and verify the processes and results of a 
digital forensics investigation. As input, PCA uses a matrix of 
cases by variables and the output of the analysis is a reduced 
set of data, the Principal Components (PC), which have values 
showing how strongly the variables correlate to each Principal 
Component. For example, processing a sample dataset of 
children's height, weight and eye colour through PCA might 
reduce to two Principal Components: One component showing 
a high correlation between height and weight and very little 
correlation with eye colour, the second component showing 
little correlation with height and weight but a high correlation 
with eye colour.   
 
Within the literature, there are different methods for the 
selection of the number of Principal Components to be used in 
the analysis, with the Eignevalue rule or Cattell's Scree test 
being popular methods. Within this paper we discuss using the 
Scree test [3], as we have found that this approach provides 
smaller number of Principal Components whilst capturing the 
highly variant data. To create a 'Scree plot' the Eigenvalues - 
values calculated from the square matrix of our variables - are 
plotted on a graph in descending order and where there is a 
significant drop off on the graph, where it is said to 'elbow', 
this would show an appropriate point to select the number of 
Principal Components. An example of a Scree plot can be seen 
in figure 1.  
 
With respect to Internet history data we can see that the 
selection of a small number of Principal Components does not 
adequately capture the variety of the users' behaviour, and 
similarly too large a number of Principal Components does not 
adequately group related variables into a ‘behaviour’. An 
interesting area of further research that has been identified is 
that the amount of variance or repetition in a 'typical' Internet 
history is unknown. Empirically we have been selecting the 
numbers of Principal Components that capture 35-45% of the 
variance in the data. Ideally the Principal Component should 
contain a minimum of two, preferably three or more variables 
that highly correlate with the it.     
B. Internet History Data 
To analyse Internet history using PCA, events must be 
recorded on the timeline in a case by variable matrix where 
the cases are the time point events and the variables are 
occurrences of Internet artefacts.  For example, if the Internet 
timeline showed five records with access to 
'www.organisation.org' with a timestamp of 00:00:05 on a 
particular date then there would be a single case for the 
'00:00:05' event and the five occurrences would be recorded as 
a magnitude in a variable, which in our experiments would be 
called 'organisation.org'. 
C. Time cases 
There are a variety of levels of precisions when dealing with 
digital timestamps as noted in [10]. The second-level of 
precision is the common minimum level of time precision that 
can be seen across log files and meta-data that are suitable for 
constructing timelines for Internet history. We have performed 
tests data grouped using larger time windows than the 1-
second level of precision, such as cases that contain all the 
events within a 5, 10 or 30 second window. There are 
advantages to grouping data in larger time windows, 
especially when the timeline has been constructed from more 
than one source and there is a concern that the artefacts are not 
synchronised, for example file system timestamps showing 
creation times before the web artefacts showing them 
appearing on the computer. The disadvantage of large time 
windows, especially very large time windows, is that data 
dependency can be introduced between the variables. 
D. Number of variables 
There is a need to sample a characteristic from the Internet 
history records to be the variable in the analysis, as although 
each individual record in the Internet history or point event on 
the timeline could be considered a distinct variable this would 
provide little to no grouping, and a larger number of variables 
compared to a small number of cases is undesirable for PCA. 
At this time, we have selected variable by the domain name 
contained within the Internet history record URI. From an 
investigative point of view there is a significant difference 
between artefacts 'mail.organisation.org', 
 'www.organisation.org' or even 'ftp.organisation.org' but by 
using the full 'authority' within the URI there would be three 
variables which would almost certainly be highly dependent 
upon each other. Consequently we have found it desirable to 
reduce further to the domain name part of the URI rather than 
the full authority, and such as 'organisation.org' would be used 
instead. 
E. The Result of the Principal Component Analysis 
After the PCA has been performed the result will be a matrix 
of the format principal components x variables. Each variable 
will have a Principal Component that it correlates with the 
most and consequently we then assign the variables with the 
maximum correlations to those Principal Components. After 
the variables have been assigned to the components it is 
possible to process the timeline replacing each of the URIs 
with the Principal Component number. 
III. CASE STUDY 
A. The Test Data 
To demonstrate the PCA analysis of Internet history we 
provide two case studies for comparison. Data set 1 comes 
from the Digital Corpora project ([13] [11]) and is a 
'simulated' set of data, in that the data is from a real system 
and has a real user interacting with the system, but the 
parameters of that usage is a scenario. Data set 2 in 
comparison is from a 'real world' set of Internet history 
artefacts and shows a real user interacting with a system 
performing their day-to-day leisure, work and study activities. 
 
Data set 1 is a forensic image that comes from the M57-
Patents scenario referred to as 'jo-2009-11-20-oldComputer' 
and is an EnCase image of a 12.1GB NTFS formatted hard 
disk drive containing an installation of Windows XP SP3. The 
Internet history timeline was constructed from the 
'Comprehensive Search' for Internet History using EnCase 
6.19 and is based upon approximately 820 Mozilla artefacts 
dated between the 13th and the 20th of November 2009. The 
timeline was processed to produce 60 domain name variables 
and 580 distinct event cases from the original 820 event 
artefacts.  
 
We constructed data set 2 from a real-world set of Internet 
history artefacts recorded from Microsoft Internet Explorer 
Version 10 on a Windows 8 PC over the period of a weekend. 
The artefacts were extracted and the timeline constructed 
directly from the WebCache database and contains 5900 
artefacts between the 8th and the 10th of November 2013. The 
timeline was processed to produce 139 domain name variables 
and 1339 distinct event cases from the original 5900 event 
artefacts.  
 
When combining timeline sources, such as from two different 
types of web browsers, care must be taken to ensure that a 
source which produces a large quantity of artefacts per time 
period, such as the Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser 
typically appears to record more artefacts than the Mozilla 
Firefox web browser. To ensure this does not skew the data, 
the correlation matrix is used during PCA rather than a 
covariance matrix. As we are assuming there is correlation 
between artefacts in our analysis, oblique rotation is preferable 
for the PCA and we have chosen the 'Direct Oblimin' 
algorithm using SPSS version 20.0.   
 
B. Number of Principal Components 
For data set 1 the Scree plot (Figure 1) shows an initial elbow 
at 3 values, with a steady decline in Eigenvalues until 15 
components are reached at which point the graph flattens off 
until 45 components is reached, where a substantial fall-off is 
observed. For data set 2 (Figure 2) the Scree plot shows a 
much less obvious elbow and more of a concave shape. The 
data appears to slow its decline at 10 Principal Components 




Figure 1 - Scree Plot of Principal Component Analysis on 
data set 1 
 
Figure 1 shows that from the initial 60 domain name variables 
that 10% of variance can be accounted for within 3 variables, 
or more accurately 3 Principal Components. Increasing the 
number of components to 15 and will account for 35% of the 
total variance in the data set, but more components than that 
only increases variance by a small linear amount. Figure 2, 
although showing a larger data set of 139 variables is quite 
similar with the first 3 Principle Components accounting for 
approximately 9% of the variance. For this paper we have 
selected 20 Principal Components, partly based upon the 
shape that can be seen in Figure 2 at 20 components, but also 
that represent 35% of the data variance, which is the same 




Figure 2 - Scree Plot of Principal Component Analysis on 
data set 2 
 
The selection of the number of Principal Components to use 
and the variance in the data is an issue of substantial further 
research within this project.  
 
C. Processing the Sessions 
After each of the variables has been assigned to a Principal 
Component the timeline is processed to reassign the variables 
to the associate Principal Component number. At this stage 
artefacts are grouped into sessions of contiguous activity and 
the membership of the sessions are analysed. A period of 
contiguous access is classified as when there are temporally 
grouped point events on the timeline that are delimited by a 
time period of greater than threshold value X. For this case 
study 15 minutes has been chosen as the threshold X value.  
 
Using a 15 minute threshold with data set 1 we have 13 
sessions. Data set 2, which was the larger, but more densely 
packed, set of data makes 7 sessions. The results of this 
session-level analysis can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. Both sets 
of data have two sessions that are quite close to the threshold 
value, 22 minutes and 25 minutes respectively, coincidentally 
occurring between sessions 4 and 5 in both data sets. There is 
an argument for extending X to cover this period but for this 
paper the sessions are kept separate.  All the other session are 
delimited by substantial gaps.  
 
D. Analysis of the Sessions 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the results of grouping the Principal 
Components into the sessions of contiguous activity. For each 
sessions we see the start and end time of the session, the total 
number of artefacts that appeared in that session and the 
artefacts group per Principal Component per session. Shading 
of the Principal Components is used on the tables to indicate 
possible patterns of similarity.  
 
It can be seen that some Principal Components appear very 
regularly in the sessions. In data set 2, in Table 2, we can see 
that Principal Components 1, 19 and 20 occur in every 
session. In data set 1, Table 1, the effect is less pronounced, 
however it can be seen that Principal Components 10, 14 or 15 
appear in every session.  
 
The Principal Components per session-level view provides a 
compact way to view like-for-like comparisons of sessions. 
Some sessions seem broadly similar in composition of the 
constituent Principal Components to others, such as can be 
seen in Table 1 where sessions 4 and 9 have broadly similar 
numbers of artefacts in the session and the Principal 
Components are very similar, although there are conspicuous 
differences between sessions 4 and 9 in the length of the 
sessions. 
 
In Table 1 we do also see other complex patterns, such as 
sessions 7 and 13 and also to some lesser extent sessions 5 and 
6. However in Table 2 we do not see the complex patterns that 
can be seen in Table 1, rather we see simpler shorter patterns. 
In Table 2 we have shown a possible pattern in sessions 1 and 
4, another possible pattern in session 2, 5 and 6 and finally in 
session 7 we see the possibility that both of these two patterns 
are overlapping.  
 
Although it is possible to do basic pattern analysis on sparsely 
populated sets of data as can be seen in Table 1, an enhanced 
approach to analysing the sessions in greater depth would 
appear to be a next step in the research, especially when 
dealing with the modern, more densely populated sessions that 
we can see in Table 2. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Data Sets and the Case Study 
Although the two data sets were not selected or designed to 
represent any specific pattern or behaviour, our approach does 
reveal patterns over a period of time. This would suggest that 
this approach may not be applicable to all kinds of forensic 
investigations such as incident response where there is only a 
short specific period of time and the holistic view of the 
system and the users and typical usage is less of a concern. An 
overview of a system would potentially be very interesting 
where there is habitual behaviour that can be extracted over a 
period of time, which might be the case in examinations where 
there is lawful access to a system to perform unlawful 
activities, the classic case of indecent photographs 
investigations. 
 
The principal difference that can be seen between data sets 1 
and 2 is the much higher density of artefacts in the session 
within data set 2, and consequently sessions 6 and 7 on Table 
2 are broadly meaningless for creating patterns due to the large 
number of artefacts in those sessions. This strongly supports 
the need for low-level patterns at the next stage of the 
research.    
B. Enhancing the Approach 
A more sophisticated low-level event modelling approach may 
be desirable for the analysis of the Principal Components, 
similar to the approach shown in Abraham [1]. As such it is 
possible to build patterns of Principal Components and of the 
Intervals between the components. In Figure 3 it can be seen 
that there are three Principal Components (PC1 to PC3) point 
events on a timeline which are separated by Intervals (i1 and 
i2). The intervals may play a crucial part of a pattern, such as 
longer intervals at certain times of day etc. The reduction of 
the data into Principal Components suggests that pattern 
analysis such as proposed in Abraham along with the time 
boundary intervals such as Gladyshev and Patel [4] noted may 
be useful. Further research will hopefully provide a 
quantification of the regularity or the uniqueness of any low-
level patterns on the system. 
 
The approach proposed in this paper for Internet history 
analysis of the timelines using Principal Component Analysis 
allows an investigator to identify points in the timeline that are 
of potentially greater interest and should be followed up 
specifically through interviewing, keyword matching or file 
matching using known signatures. For example, an 
investigator identifying the download of an unauthorised or 
illegal file to a system that is exhibiting a regular and complex 
pattern is unlikely to be a one-off user. An investigator could 
determine the overlap of components that contain 
'identification information', information that could reasonably 
belong to a specific user of the system, and components that 




Figure 3 - Principal Components and Intervals on a Timeline 
 
C. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Sampling Adequacy 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling adequacy test  [8] 
literature highlights that data that produces KMO of less than 
0.5 is unsuitable for Factor Analysis. In this case study, data 
set 1 has a KMO value of 0.334, and data set 2 has a KMO 
value of 0.503. This would suggest that from a statistical point 
of view that PCA may not be suitable or a barely sufficiently 
powerful approach to the analysis of Internet History. 
However, experimentally it can be seen that PCA does appear 
to be successfully grouping related artefacts that are regularly 
occurring in the Internet history but with a low statistical 
power rating due to the large quantity of the data that is 'one 
off' or infrequently occurring, which is still potentially 
interesting data but might under normal circumstances be 
considered outlier data. 
D. Variance in the Data & PCA Sampling 
In data set 1 using 15 Principal Components approximately 
35% of the variance is accounted for, which is to say that 60 
variables are being adequately represented by 15 components, 
which appears very effective with Principal Component 1 
having three variables with correlation values of 0.955, 0.947 
and 0.706 respectively, however Principal Component 14's 
maximum values are 0.269 and 0.253 respectively.  Of the 60 
domain name variables selected in the data set 1 case study, 21 
of the variables have maximum correlations that are less 0.2 
when choosing to use 15 Principal Components in the 
analysis. In data set 2, 40 of the 139 variables have maximum 
correlations that are less than 0.2 when choosing to use 20 
Principal Components. It may be necessary to identify and 
suppresses variables that have a correlation with a Principal 
Component of less than X, where X is a value that further 
research will have to establish.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes a novel method of analysing Internet 
history artefacts typical to Digital Forensic investigations 
using the unsupervised statistical learning technique Principal 
Component Analysis. The findings we show in this research 
paper are promising for identifying, reducing and modelling 
the Internet history of a user's behaviour.  
 
After demonstrating a high-level tabular view of simple 
patterns for the analysis of the Internet history, further work 
includes the development of low-level rule-based analysis on 
the Principal Components, more sophisticated methods of 
analysis and additional types of interactive user logs, such as 
chat logs, file system and operating system events related to 
the behaviour of the system or user.   
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